The immediate backdrop is the prolonged Yemeni civil war and its spillover into Red Sea security, where renewed maritime attacks and international naval escorts have raised stakes for littoral states since late 2023.
The regional security environment was further destabilized in March 2026 when the United States and Israel launched coordinated strikes against Iranian infrastructure; that campaign has produced reciprocal Iranian and proxy responses across the Middle East that shape how countries bordering the Red Sea assess freedom of navigation and maritime risk.
Eritrea’s foreign minister, Osman Saleh, told Middle East Eye that there is no military solution to Yemen’s conflict and that outside powers cannot subdue the Yemeni people.
Saleh framed the crisis as fundamentally political and said coastal states bordering the Red Sea should determine how to manage freedom of navigation, underscoring his view that regional actors must assume responsibility for maritime security rather than rely on external military interventions.
Saleh also said Yemen lacks a cohesive central government, a point he used to argue that unilateral maritime enforcement or military campaigns will not succeed. Middle East Eye carried Saleh’s remarks without attributing them to a specific negotiation forum or listing any proposed mechanism for how littoral states would coordinate navigation rules.
The Eritrean foreign minister’s comments place Eritrea among regional voices urging nonmilitary, politically negotiated approaches, while shifting the burden for Red Sea management to neighbouring states.
The reporting does not provide independent evidence of any new multilateral plan or of which littoral states endorse Saleh’s prescription, nor does it quantify current disruptions to shipping or name actors conducting maritime enforcement.
Saleh’s remarks are significant because they press nearby governments to consider sovereignty-based arrangements for maritime passage and suggest Eritrea opposes further external military involvement in Yemen’s conflict.
Whether littoral states named by regional diplomacy or meetings endorse Saleh’s call and produce a coordinated Red Sea navigation plan by the next regional summit or ministerial meeting. 2) Whether any littoral state publicly rejects Eritrea’s prescription and instead invites additional external naval patrols or coalition operations. 3) Whether Yemeni negotiating parties reference Saleh’s framing in any upcoming peace talks or statements to assert the need for political settlement.