
The immediate backdrop is the ongoing March 2026 conflict in which the United States and Israel carried out coordinated strikes on Iranian power plants, air defenses and military infrastructure after years of Iranian nuclear enrichment acceleration and stepped-up proxy attacks that Western intelligence assessed as creating imminent threats to regional security.
Structurally, those hostilities were shaped by the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in May 2018 and the subsequent years of sanctions and counter-sanctions imposed by the U.S. Treasury and allied partners through 2018–2025.
A New York Post opinion argues that the real short-term danger from artificial intelligence comes not from a Hollywood-style apocalypse but from bad actors who could exploit a retreat of American tech to weaponize advanced models (per nypost.com).
The column foregrounds the resignation of Anthropic researcher Jacob Coxon, who warned that the rush to develop AI is 'gambling with our lives,' and cites a current Anthropic employee who said, 'We really do earnestly believe A.I. could kill all humans!' while placing the odds above 10% over the next decade (per nypost.com).
The author disputes catastrophic framings centered on present consumer systems, writing that ChatGPT 'doesn’t seem particularly well-suited to destroying humanity' and noting its frequent errors on basic tasks as evidence that current models are mistake-prone (per nypost.com).
At the same time, the column concedes and warns that so-called 'frontier models' under development in research labs are reportedly advancing faster and becoming more powerful than expected, creating a window in which malicious actors could weaponize capabilities or hack critical systems if safeguards lag (per nypost.com).
The piece thus separates immediate practical risks—model misuse, hacking, and weaponization by adversaries—from longer-term speculative scenarios about AI independently annihilating humanity, arguing policy and defensive attention should prioritize the former (per nypost.com).
The author treats the viral resignations and doomsday statements as politically potent but contrasts them with technical skepticism about current systems' destructive capacities (per nypost.com).
The column's practical takeaway is a policy one: focus scarce regulatory and security resources on preventing bad actors from exploiting rapid, concentrated progress inside U.S. tech labs rather than primarily debating apocalyptic timelines (per nypost.com).
The piece does not present independent evidence of a weaponized breach or a concrete misuse event; instead it synthesizes resignations and warnings within Anthropic and technical assessments of present models to argue for prioritization of threat mitigation (per nypost.com).
Whether Anthropic leadership or other U.S. AI labs publish concrete safeguards or governance commitments in response to public resignations and warnings (per nypost.com). 2) Whether U.S. policymakers or regulators propose focused rules or funding for defensive security measures aimed at preventing model weaponization within six months (per nypost.com). 3) Whether additional employees at Anthropic or other labs issue public resignations or probability estimates about existential risk that reshape the policy debate (per nypost.com).